OneDosh raised $3 million in pre-seed funding to build stablecoin-powered payment infrastructure for cross-border money movement. Founded in February 2025 by Jackson Ukuevo (CEO), Godwin Okoye, and Babatunde Osinowo, the company is less than one year old.
The founding team brings experience from ZeroHash (crypto infrastructure), Plaid (fintech API), and Amazon (large-scale product development), with backgrounds spanning payments infrastructure, compliance operations, and product development. Investors were not disclosed.
OneDosh currently operates in the United States and Nigeria. The platform allows users to transfer money between the two countries, hold value in stablecoins, and spend globally using stablecoin-backed cards integrated with Apple Pay and Google Pay, accepted anywhere Visa is supported.
The funding will be used to expand payment corridors beyond US-Nigeria, deepen liquidity partnerships, and support senior-level hires.
Comparison
The US-Nigeria remittance corridor processes billions annually, and OneDosh is far from the first to try solving it with crypto or stablecoins. Grey (formerly Aboki Africa) raised $2 million seed in 2021 to build stablecoin rails for African cross-border payments, focusing on the same US-Nigeria corridor. Chipper Cash raised over $300 million to enable cross-border payments across Africa, initially using crypto rails before pivoting. Bitnob offers Bitcoin and stablecoin-powered remittances between the US and Nigeria. LemFi (formerly Lemonade Finance) raised $33 million Series A in 2023 for diaspora remittances between UK/US/Canada and Nigeria/Ghana/Kenya using traditional rails, not stablecoins.
The traditional remittance players include WorldRemit (acquired by Zepz for $5 billion combined valuation with Sendwave), Western Union (processes $200+ million annually in Nigeria), and MoneyGram. These use correspondent banking networks and mobile money partnerships, charging 3-8% in fees.
What differentiates stablecoin approaches: Traditional remittances route through correspondent banks with 2-5 day settlement, 3-8% fees, and dependence on banking relationships. Stablecoin rails theoretically offer instant settlement, sub-1% fees, and independence from banking infrastructure. The reality has been more complicated.
Grey’s journey illustrates the challenges. Despite raising $2 million and building stablecoin infrastructure, the company faced repeated regulatory scrutiny, struggled with liquidity in Nigeria, and eventually had to rely on traditional banking rails for local disbursement. Chipper Cash discovered that crypto rails didn’t solve the fundamental problem: converting crypto to local currency still requires banking partners, and those partners face the same regulatory constraints as traditional remittance providers.
The pattern: Every stablecoin remittance startup starts with the same thesis—crypto eliminates middlemen and reduces costs. Every one discovers the same bottleneck: converting stablecoins to naira in Nigeria requires Nigerian banks or mobile money operators, and they control the gate.
Business Model Reality
Stablecoin remittances work in theory through four steps: User in US buys USDT or USDC, sends stablecoin to Nigeria-based wallet, recipient converts stablecoin to naira, recipient withdraws naira to bank account or mobile money. Each step has friction that undermines the cost advantage.
Step one: US user buying stablecoins typically pays 0.5-2% in exchange fees plus network fees (Ethereum gas or other blockchain transaction costs). Step two: Sending stablecoins has near-zero fees on efficient blockchains but requires both sender and receiver to have crypto wallets and understand how to use them. Step three: Converting stablecoins to naira in Nigeria is where the economics break down—this requires liquidity, and Nigerian liquidity for crypto is fragmented across peer-to-peer platforms, over-the-counter desks, and licensed exchanges. Step four: Withdrawing naira to banks incurs standard Nigerian banking fees plus potential compliance delays.
Total cost to send $100 from US to Nigeria via stablecoins: Exchange fee to buy USDC $1-$2, network fee $0.50-$3 depending on blockchain, conversion spread in Nigeria 1-3% ($1-$3), bank withdrawal fee $0.50-$1. Total: $3-$9.50, or 3-9.5%. This is comparable to or higher than Western Union’s 3-5% for the same corridor.
The promised advantage disappears when you account for the full cost stack. Speed is better—stablecoins settle in minutes versus days—but only if the recipient actually wants crypto. Most Nigerian recipients want naira in their bank accounts, which requires the same slow banking processes.
OneDosh’s card play adds another layer. Issuing stablecoin-backed Visa cards requires partnerships with card issuers, compliance with Visa network rules, maintaining stablecoin reserves to back card balances, and managing foreign exchange risk when users spend in currencies other than the stablecoin denomination.
If OneDosh issues a $1,000 card backed by USDC, and the user spends in Lagos, someone needs to convert USDC to naira at the point of sale. That’s either OneDosh holding naira liquidity (capital-intensive, exposes them to naira devaluation), or partnering with Nigerian banks for real-time conversion (reintroduces the banking dependencies they’re trying to avoid).
The fundamental challenge: You can’t bypass Nigerian banks if your end users need naira. And if you need Nigerian banks, you face the same regulatory requirements, capital requirements, and operational costs as traditional remittance providers.
Risk
Nigerian regulators view crypto with deep suspicion. The Central Bank of Nigeria banned banks from servicing crypto companies in 2021, reversed it in 2023 with strict conditions, and maintains tight oversight. OneDosh operating stablecoin rails means they’re either fully licensed and compliant (capital-intensive, slow-moving), operating in regulatory gray areas (high shutdown risk), or routing through licensed partners who take margin (eliminates cost advantage).
If OneDosh is unlicensed, the CBN could freeze operations overnight, as happened to multiple Nigerian crypto exchanges between 2021-2023. If they’re licensed, they face minimum capital requirements, strict reporting obligations, and limits on transaction volumes. If they’re partnering with licensed entities, those partners charge 1-2% fees, eliminating the cost advantage over traditional remittance providers.
Liquidity risk compounds the regulatory risk. Stablecoin-to-naira conversion requires deep, reliable liquidity in Nigerian markets. Nigeria’s crypto liquidity dried up multiple times during 2021-2023 regulatory crackdowns, causing conversion spreads to blow out from 1% to 5-10%. OneDosh needs either to maintain their own naira liquidity pools (capital-intensive) or rely on external liquidity providers (exposes users to variable pricing).
Competition comes from two directions. Traditional players like LemFi, Sendwave, and WorldRemit have solved US-Nigeria remittances using licensed banking rails, achieving 2-4% all-in costs with superior UX and no crypto complexity. Crypto-native players like Grey, Bitnob, and Chipper Cash have years of experience navigating Nigerian regulations, established liquidity sources, and battle-tested compliance systems.
OneDosh enters as the newest player with three founders, $3 million, and less than one year of operation. They’re competing against companies with $300 million+ raised (Chipper Cash), decade-long track records (Western Union), and regulatory licenses that took years to acquire.
The card product creates additional exposure. Visa cards require partnerships with licensed issuers, typically banks or payment service providers who charge issuance fees, monthly fees, and take a percentage of interchange. A stablecoin-backed card that actually works globally requires OneDosh to maintain reserves in multiple currencies or real-time conversion capabilities, both capital-intensive. If card balances are in USDC but users spend in naira, euros, and pounds, OneDosh either takes the foreign exchange risk or passes it to users via unfavorable conversion rates.
Team risk centers on execution capability. ZeroHash, Plaid, and Amazon experience demonstrates technical competence but doesn’t guarantee success in African fintech, which requires navigating complex regulatory environments, building local partnerships, and understanding informal payment behaviors. First-time founders in a category where dozens have tried and struggled face steep learning curves.
The $3 million runway problem: At pre-seed with three founders, $3 million might last 18-24 months at African burn rates ($100,000-150,000 monthly for salaries, compliance, infrastructure, and customer acquisition). To reach Series A, OneDosh needs to demonstrate substantial traction—ideally $500,000+ monthly volume, 10,000+ active users, and sustainable unit economics. Achieving that in 18 months while building regulatory relationships, securing liquidity, and competing with established players is extremely difficult.
Prediction
By August 2026 (six months), if OneDosh announces transaction volumes or user numbers, they’re gaining traction. Most pre-seed fintechs stay quiet about metrics if they’re weak. Watch for regulatory announcements—if they announce partnerships with licensed Nigerian payment service providers or money transfer operators, they’re building compliant infrastructure. If silent on regulatory strategy, they’re either still navigating approvals or operating in gray areas.
By February 2027 (12 months, one year old), success looks like $1 million+ monthly transaction volume, 5,000+ monthly active users, and clear path to profitability with sub-2% cost structure. They should have expanded beyond US-Nigeria to at least one additional corridor (UK-Nigeria or US-Ghana being most likely). Partial success: $500,000 monthly volume, 2,000 users, operating but not yet profitable, still only US-Nigeria. Failure: Under $200,000 monthly volume, struggling with Nigerian bank partnerships, burning through runway without clear path to Series A.
Track the card rollout carefully. If stablecoin cards are widely available and actually being used for everyday spending by February 2027, that validates the product thesis. If cards are limited beta or facing compliance delays, the product is harder than anticipated. If OneDosh pivots away from cards to focus only on remittances, they’ve discovered the card economics don’t work.
By February 2028 (24 months), OneDosh needs Series A or they’re in trouble. Success: Raised $8-15 million Series A at $40-60 million valuation, processing $5 million+ monthly across 3-4 corridors, 20,000+ monthly active users, unit economics proven with 1-2% take rate generating $50,000-100,000 monthly revenue, team grown to 15-25 people. Partial success: Raised small extension round ($2-5 million), processing $2-3 million monthly, 8,000-10,000 users, breakeven or near-breakeven but limited growth. Failure: Unable to raise Series A, processing under $1 million monthly, burned through $3 million with limited traction, founders exploring pivot or shutdown.
By February 2029 (three years, Series A maturity), success requires OneDosh to be processing $10-20 million monthly across 5+ corridors, generating $200,000-400,000 monthly revenue at 2% take rate, with clear path to profitability at scale. If they’ve achieved this without raising more than $20 million total, they’ve proven the stablecoin thesis works. If they’ve raised $50 million+ and still aren’t profitable, stablecoins didn’t solve the fundamental economics of remittances.
The critical question: Can OneDosh actually deliver sub-2% all-in costs to Nigerian recipients including all conversion fees, withdrawal fees, and spread? If yes, they win on price and should capture market share from traditional providers. If no, they’re just another remittance option with similar costs but higher complexity.
Benchmark: LemFi (traditional rails) processes $100 million+ annually with 100,000+ users after three years and $33 million raised. If OneDosh reaches similar scale with half the capital ($15-20 million total raised), stablecoins provided efficiency advantages. If OneDosh needs equal or more capital to reach the same scale, stablecoins were a technology choice but not a business model advantage.
Watch liquidity partnerships as the tell. If OneDosh announces partnerships with major Nigerian banks (Access Bank, GTBank, First Bank) or mobile money operators (MTN, Airtel), they’ve solved the naira liquidity problem through traditional channels, which means they’re essentially operating like LemFi with crypto in the middle. If they announce partnerships with crypto liquidity providers or OTC desks, they’re staying crypto-native, which is higher risk but potentially lower cost if it works.
The honest assessment: Stablecoin remittances make theoretical sense—lower costs, faster settlement, no correspondent banks. Every company that’s tried has discovered the problem isn’t international settlement, it’s local disbursement. You still need Nigerian banks to convert crypto to naira and deliver it to recipients. Those banks don’t care whether you sent dollars or stablecoins—they charge the same fees and impose the same compliance requirements.
OneDosh’s success depends on whether they’ve found a way around this bottleneck that Grey, Chipper Cash, and a dozen others couldn’t find. Three founders with strong tech backgrounds and $3 million have 18 months to prove it. If transaction volumes aren’t growing rapidly by August 2026, the market is telling them the same thing it told their predecessors: stablecoins are a rails technology, not a remittance business model.
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